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CASE NOTES
Labor Law—Antitrust Law—Exemption of Labor Union from Sherman
Act.—American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carro11. 1—The plaintiff orchestra
leaders brought this action against the American Federation of Musicians
(AFM) for alleged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act. 2
 The plaintiffs contended that certain practices of the AFM affecting
orchestra leaders on "club-dates" violated the Sherman Act by constituting a
conspiracy with a "nonlabor group" to violate the antitrust laws. "Club-
dates" are one-time engagements of orchestras to provide music, usually for
only a few hours at such events as wedding receptions and commencements.
On "club-dates" the orchestra leader secures the engagement, either by him-
self or through booking agents, and negotiates directly with the music pur-
chaser, usually for a flat fee. He is responsible for collecting the fee, paying
the sidemen, withholding taxes and keeping records. 3 In the "club-date" single
engagement field there are no collective bargaining agreements. Single engage-
ments are rigidly regulated by unilaterally-adopted union bylaws and regula-
tions. The AFM had acquired a virtual closed shop in the New York City
area by means of agreements with hotels, booking agents and record com-
panies. Thus, the union's bylaws regulated substantially all the musicians'
employment. The bylaw principally challenged by the plaintiffs as violative
of the antitrust laws was one requiring each member orchestra leader to
follow a "Price List Booklet" which imposed minimum price scales for
orchestra leaders to charge. The bylaws also required each leader to employ
a minimum number of sidemen for club-date engagements and to use a
union-drawn standard contract. The four orchestra leaders in this case were
fulltime leader-employers. They maintained offices and employed personnel
to solicit engagements through advertising and personal contact. They had
regular groups of musician-employees from which they selected the number
necessary for each engagement. The plaintiff-leaders all had established
businesses with their own clienteles and reputations. The plaintiff-leaders
charged that the union's involvement of the orchestra leaders—who were
held by the court of appeals to be employers and independent contractors
in the club-date field4—in the promulgation and enforcement of the challenged
regulations and bylaws created a combination with a "nonlabor" group which
violated the Sherman Act. 5 The district court dismissed the action on the
merits, stating that the activities of the union were exempt from the antitrust
laws as activities affecting a "labor group" which is party to a "labor dispute"
under the Norris-La Guardia Act. 6 The Court of Appeals for the Second
1 391 U.S. 99 (1968).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
3 Carroll v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 372 F.2d 155, 159 (2d Cir. 1967).
4 Id.
5 Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797 (1945), established the
rule that a union would be denied exemption from the antitrust laws if it combined with
a nonlabor group to achieve a commercial restraint.
6 Carroll V, American Fed'n of Musicians, 241 F. Supp. 865, 894 (1965).
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Circuit reversed on the issue of price fixing but in all other respects affirmed
the dismissal.'
The Supreme Court, Justices White and Black dissenting, vacated the
decision of the court of appeals, and affirmed the district court decision.
HELD: Where the work and functions of the orchestra leaders actually or
potentially affect the hours, wages or job security of members of musicians'
unions, union practices affecting leaders do not violate the Sherman Act
since they are exempted by the Norris-LaGuardia Act as activities affecting
a "labor group" which is party to a "labor dispute." 8
This case represents the latest in a recent series of Supreme Court
efforts9
 to balance the conflicting policies between the national labor policy
and the antitrust laws. Carroll first presents the issue whether the orchestra
leaders constitute a "labor group." The second major issue is whether a union,
even if not in conspiracy with a nonlabor group, may unilaterally impose
price scales without being subject to the antitrust laws. This issue involves the
extent to which a union may use its exemption from the antitrust laws to
engage in practices, such as price fixing, that would be clear antitrust viola-
tions if practiced by a nonlabor group. The final issue treated in this note
deals with what connections between a union and a nonlabor group are
necessary to constitute a combination in restraint of trade.
The definition of a labor group. The Supreme Court based its holding
partly on the finding of the district court that, although the orchestra leaders
are deemed employers and independent contractors, they constitute a labor
group. 1° The reasoning leading to this conclusion deserves analysis. The
Court agreed with the district court that the criterion to be used in determin-
ing whether the orchestra leaders were a labor group was the "presence of a
job or wage competition or some other economic interrelationship affecting
legitimate union interests between the union members and the independent
contractors."n If such a relationship existed, the independent contractors
were a Iabor group and party to a labor dispute under the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. The Norris-LaGuardia Act exempts all labor disputes involving terms
or conditions of employment from the reach of the Sherman Act and estab-
lishes that the allowable area of union activity is not to be restricted to an
immediate employer-employee relationshipP The Court agreed with the de-
termination of the district court that because the leaders performed work and
functions which competed with the interests of the union's members they
1
 372 F.2d at 168.
8 391 U.S. at 105-14.
9 See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) ; and Local 189,
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
1 ° 391 U.S. at 105; see 241 F. Supp. at 887-88.
11 241 F. Supp. at 887.
12 The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or con-
ditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or con-
ditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee.
Norris-LaGuardia Act § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 113 (c) (1964).
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were a labor group." The Court stated that every time a full-time leader
secures an engagement he "displaces" a union member who may be bidding
for the same job."
The Court joined the plaintiffs, who are full-time orchestra leaders and
employers, into a "group" with any other musicians who may perform only
occasionally as leaders. This analysis ignores the functions of the plaintiffs
as businessmen and entrepreneurs. Because the full-time leader performs
many functions not performed by the union member who occasionally leads,
there is no real, direct competition between the two. The full-time leader as
a manager and employer provides jobs for union members; he does not
"displace" them. In a case where the leader does not personally lead, but
solicits an engagement and hires a subleader to lead for him, he performs no
so-called labor group work. The leader's function is solely that of entre-
preneur. Through his reputation as an established provider of music, he
acquires a customer, makes the necessary arrangements for servicing the
customer, including employment and supervision of staff, and maintains the.
administrative structure required for this work, i.e., office, payroll clerk and
permanent telephone listing. As the dissent points out, "Managing and ad-
ministering a business whose function is supplying bands to fathers of brides
is not 'labor group work.' "15
Even where the full-time leader performs with his orchestra, he must
perform in the unique manner required for leading and not in the manner of any
union member employee. Even though the dissent concedes that the musical
aspects of leading are "labor group" work, the conclusion is arguable. It
could be viewed as supervisory work so that when a leader, who actually
conducts, "displaces" a union member who would lead if the leader did not,
he displaces him only in a supervisory capacity, even if he plays an instrument
as well.
The purpose of the National Labor Relations Act is to foster the peaceful
operation of labor relations through the procedure of collective bargaining."
To bargain collectively there must be two sides, the employer and the em-
ployees, with distinct rights and obligations. Therefore, the NLRA specifi-
cally defines employers, supervisors and independent contractors in order to
maintain the status of these groups distinct from that of the employees."
The preservation of the two parties necessary for collective bargaining re-
quires that the employee not be forced into the union which organized his
employees. The orchestra-leader employers' clear status as employers and a
nonlabor group should not be changed by the labelling of part of their func-
tions as labor group work.
The major precedent cited by the Court" in support of the proposition
13 391 U.S. at 105-06; see 241 F. Supp. at 887-88.
14 391 U.S. at 1I1 n.11.
15 Id. at 115 (dissenting opinion).
16 "It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining . . • ." National Labor Relations Act [here-
inafter cited as NLRAI § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
17 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), (11) (1964).
18 391 U.S. at 107.
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that the union may pressure the orchestra leaders to become union members
did not deal with employers who perform many functions which their em-
ployees do not perform. Local 753, Milk Wagon Drivers v. Lake Valley Farm
Prods., Inc." dealt with pressure to unionize independent delivery drivers who
performed exactly the same functions as the union's employees. They per-
formed no employer functions, as the orchestra leaders did in Carroll. Lake
Valley dealt with the special evils of a system of contracting out to indepen-
dent drivers which cut into the business of union employers and affected
unfavorably the wages and employment of union members. 2° Even in an area
such as the recording industry, where the purchaser of the music is the actual
employer,21
 the orchestra leader is still a "supervisor" as defined by the
NLRA as one who has authority in the interest of the employer to hire and
lay off employees.22 As stated before, the NLRA specifically defines super-
visors separately from employees.
The Court's designation of employers as a "labor group" because they
perform some "labor group work" could lead to rather questionable results
if it were to be applied to any industry other than the unique music business.
The Court has little justification for dividing an employer's functions into
labor group work and nonlabor group work. This analysis might allow a
union or court to decide that, because any employer performs some routine
functions which his employees could handle, he can be pressured into the
same union with his employees. The mere fact that the owner of a small store
sometimes works at the counter should not give the clerk's union a right to
force him into the same union with his employees. The Court cites no prece-
dent for its conclusion that employers may constitute a labor group because
they perform some functions their employees could perform. The anomalous
position of employers as a labor group demeans the integrity of their status.
It seems now that orchestra leaders, to be classified as a nonlabor group,
must deprive themselves of some part of their own job if it is something which
a union employee could perform. An orchestra leader should have the right to
follow his chosen profession free of coercion by a union in which, as an
employer, he has no place to give up part of his functions. The policy of the
National Labor Relations Act is to promote the process of collective bargain-
ing.23 The Court would seem to defeat this goal by denying the plaintiff
orchestra leaders their rightful status as employers and by allowing the union
unilaterally to impose bylaws and regulations upon them in place of negotiation
through collective bargaining.
19 311 U.S. 91 (1940).
20 Meat Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94 (1962). also cited by the Court
in Carroll as support for their conclusion that the orchestra leaders were a labor group,
actually found that independent drivers, who performed substantially the same work as
employee-drivers, were a nonlabor group since the union treated them as a body separate
from the rest of the members.
21 In the recording industry a regular employee of the recording company exercises
general supervision over the orchestra hired. He selects the orchestra leader, who does
the conducting and some arranging, hires the sidemen and determines their number, their
instruments and the compositions to be played, and exercises general control over the
orchestra's performance. 372 17.2d at 159.
22
 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1964).
23 NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964), quoted in part at note 16 supra.
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The imposition of price scales. The second major issue in Carroll was
whether the imposition of the Price List Booklet amounted to price fixing in
violation of the Sherman Act. Even if the orchestra leaders are considered a
labor group there is an additional ground upon which the legality of the
union's activities must be tested. If the unions coerced the leaders about a
matter which is not a "term or condition of employment," they would not be
exempt from the Sherman Act, "because the Norris-LaGuardia Act affords
immunity from the impact of anti-trust laws only for 'labor disputes'; it does
not provide blanket exemption." 24
 The Court agreed with the district court's
statement that, " ri view of the competition between leaders and sidemen
and subleaders which underlies the finding that the leaders are a labor group,
the union has a legitimate interest in fixing . . minimum engagement
prices . . "25
 The dissent quoted with approval the conclusion of the court of
appeals that "the unions' establishment of price floors on orchestral engage-
ments constitutes a per se violation of the Sherman Act." 26
 The majority in
Carroll based its conclusion that the price lists were legal on the argument
that a leader is in job and wage competition with the subleaders and sidemen
who are union members. This reasoning again fails to give sufficient weight
to the status of the plaintiffs as full-time leader-employers, even if they are
classified as a labor group.
The Court emphasized a footnote in Local 189, Meat Cutters v. Jewel
Tea Co.27
 which stated that "the crucial determinant is not the form of the
agreement—e.g., prices or wages—but its relative impact on the product
market and the interests of union members."28 The Court found that the price
floors actually operated to protect the wages of the subleaders and sidemen.
In Jewel Tea, the Meat Cutters Union sought to prevent any store in the
Chicago area from selling meat except during the hours of 9:00 A.M. to
6:00 P.M. All members of a bargaining association of stores acceded to the
union's demand except Jewel Tea Company. The union called a strike against it
which finally forced Jewel Tea to acquiesce. The Supreme Court held that
the marketing hours restriction was imposed by the unions to serve their own
interests respecting conditions of employment, and was therefore within the
labor exemption of the Sherman Act. But the Court in Carroll ignored
the clear, unanimous expression of Jewel Tea that there is no antitrust
immunity for a union which joins with employers to fix the price at which
the employers sell to the public." This prohibition against a union's fixing
prices through collective bargaining would certainly seem to forbid a union
unilaterally to impose fixed prices on employers.
The Court found additional support for sustaining the validity of the
24 372 F.2d at 164.
25 241 F. Supp. at 890.
26 372 F.2d at 165.
27 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
28
 Id. at 690 n.5.
29 "In Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., . . the entire Court joined opinions strongly
suggesting there is no antitrust immunity for a union which joins with employers to fix
the prices at which the employers sell to the public." 391 U.S. at 117-18 (dissenting
opinion).
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price floors in Local 24, Teamsters v. Oliver, 30
 where the union was permitted
to compel, through a collective bargaining agreement, a carrier to pay certain
wages to its employees and also to pay a profitable rental to owner-drivers,
who were independent contractors performing the same function as union
members. The prices received by the owner-drivers were a term or condition
of employment of the union members, because "an inadequate rental might
mean the progressive curtailment of jobs through the withdrawal of more
and more carrier-owned vehicles from service." 3 ' The Court stated that the
Price List in Carroll served the same function as the price scales in Article
XXXII of the collective bargaining agreement in Oliver:
The Price List has in common with Article XXXII the objective to
protect employees' job opportunities and wages from job and wage
competition of other union members—in the case of the Article,
drivers when they drive their own vehicles, and in the case of the
Price List, musicians on the occasion they are leaders and play a
role as employers."
The last part of this statement by the Court minimizes the importance of
the plaintiffs' position as full-time leader-employers. They do not merely
"play a role as employers." The goal of the price scales in Oliver was to pro-
tect a negotiated wage scale against possible undermining. In Carroll, there
was no negotiated wage scale to protect, only wage scales unilaterally imposed
by the union, which had refused to bargain collectively. Another factor
distinguishing the cases is that Oliver dealt with independently-contracted
employees who performed exactly the same functions as the union's employees.
Carroll deals with employers who perform many functions that union musi-
cians do not perform.
The Court also found justification for the price lists in the limits of the
labor exemption set down by Jewel Tea. That case set two standards for a
union exemption. First, the union must act in its own self-interest, rather
than in combination with nonlabor groups. Secondly, even if the union's
activities are unilateral, they must intimately concern a subject relating to
matters of "immediate and direct union concern"—wages, hours and working
conditions—rather than to matters such as prices which are of only indirect
concern to the union. There is no doubt that in Carroll the union members
had a close concern with the prices which their employer charged. But this
concern should not give the union the right to usurp the management pre-
rogative of price determination when it may protect its wage scales through
Iess drastic means. The union certainly has the right to bargain for minimum
wages which an employer must pay, but it should not be allowed to enforce
such a legitimate goal through means that violate the antitrust laws. The
majority in Carroll seems to indicate that, as long as unions act unilaterally
and as long as their activities affect the wages, hours and working conditions
of their men, they may use broad means to achieve this goal. It is hard to
3o 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
31 Id. at 294.
32 391 U.S. at 109-10.
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believe that Congress intended the labor exemption to be carried so far.
As Justice White stated in dissent:
[P]rice competition, a significant aid to satisfactory resource allo-
cation and a deterrent to inflation, would be substantially diminished
if industry-wide unions were free to dictate uniform prices through
agreements with employers. I have always thought that this strong
policy outweighed the legitimate union interest in the prices at
which employers sell . . . .33
In its interpretation of Jewel Tea, the Carroll Court seems to be moving
toward Justice Goldberg's concurring statement in the former case. There he
expressed the view that the subjects of mandatory bargaining may extend
beyond mere direct job and wage competition and that "collective bargaining
activity containing mandatory subjects of bargaining under the Labor Act
is not subject to the antitrust laws." 34 Even though the Court states that it
expresses no opinion on whether all union activities concerning subjects of
mandatory bargaining are exempt from the Sherman Act, 35 it certainly seems
to imply such a result. The Court in Carroll seems to say that because the
union has a direct interest in the prices which their employers charge, it may
regulate these prices in a manner violative of the antitrust laws if practiced
by a nonlabor group. This rationale neglects the balance of union interest in
prices against the strong public policy to promote legitimate price competition.
This public policy suggests that subjects of mandatory bargaining not
carry with them an automatic exemption from the antitrust laws. Where
wages are a direct percentage of product prices, the union, in order to raise
wages, might insist that a group of employers adhere to minimum prices.
As Oliver held, prices may have a sufficiently direct link with wages to con-
stitute a bargainable item. That fact does not, however, resolve the issue whether
the price-fixing agreement violates the Sherman Act. Like other groups, unions
are subject to limitations in the methods which they may use in advancing
even their most legitimate interests.3° The Sherman Act contains one such
limit. Therefore, the criteria used to establish a union exemption from the
antitrust laws cannot be solely "the directness or importance of the employees'
interests; they must also reflect the impact of the methods used on competition
in the product market." 37 The Court's statement in Carroll that the form of
the agreement is not relevant, and that the only criterion for determining the
question of the price floors is their legitimate relation to the employees'
interests, ignores such an impact. The Court fails to mention the unanimous
rejection in Jewel Tea of union efforts to fix industry-wide prices. Also, as
the court of appeals in Carroll points out:
The arguments that musicians are interested in the prices charged
by their employers, because they form the boundary of the wages
33 Id. at 119 (dissenting opinion; footnote omitted).
34 381 U.S. at 710 (opinion of Goldberg, J.).
25 391 U.S. at 1I0.
36 Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 659, 697-98 (1965).
87 Id. at 733.
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they can expect to receive is not persuasive because it would justify
an invasion of the proper function of management, which, with few
exceptions, would go beyond any balancing of the labor and anti-
trust laws and effect the complete paralyzation of the latter. [Cita-
tion omitted.j The same principle would support union-instigated
price-fixing in any industry. 38
Even if the union has a legitimate interest in protecting the wage scales
set for its members, it should not be allowed to use methods which directly
restrict price competition when other methods which do not have such an
effect are readily available. In Oliver there was no other method for the union
to protect its members from the destructive competition of the owner-drivers.
In Carroll, however, the union, through such methods as wage scales and
closed shop agreements," could have achieved the same result without restrict-
ing legitimate price competition. In addition, the union has no legitimate in-
terest in setting a minimum fee for an employer, who is not a proper subject
for union regulation. In balancing the policy of promoting price competition
with the legitimate interests of union members, the courts should consider
whether the union has other reasonable means to protect its interests without
restricting such competition.
In upholding the validity of the price floors, the majority in Carroll
points up a weak link in the opinions of Justices White and Goldberg in
Jewel Tea. Neither opinion explained why a marketing-hour restriction
should be validated, while price fixing by way of collective bargaining should
be denied exemption. The characterization of the former as "directly related"
to the employee's interests and the latter as "indirectly related" does not
diminish the similar type of restriction which both policies put on competi-
tion. As one commentator put the question: "Is price-fixing . . . less directly
related to the employees' legitimate interest in more pay and more stable
employment than the marketing hour restriction viewed essentially as a
means of protecting independents and their employees against the competitive
pressure of self-service operations?" 4° Perhaps the majority in Carroll has
finally recognized that there is no substantial difference. Justice White, who
wrote the dissent in Carroll, seems to be the victim of his own failure in
Jewel Tea to explain the difference in anticompetitive effect between market
hour restrictions and price fixing.'"
The nature of a combination. Another question raised by the decision
asks what connections between a union and a nonlabor group are necessary
38 372 F.2d at 165.
30 In United States v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 47 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ill. 1942),
aff'd per curiam, 318 U.S. 741 (1943), it was held that the union's attempt to "eliminate
all musical performances over the radio except those presented in person by members of
the American Federation of Musicians," id. at 307, was exempted from the Sherman Act
by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. This decision allows the closed shop because, by limiting
employment to union members, a union is coercing nonunion workers to join it.
48 Meltzer, supra note 36, at 733.
41 It is also ironic that Justice Douglas, who dissented in Jewel Tea, joined in up-
holding the union's anticompetitive behavior in Carroll. Why he would condemn the fixing
of uniform store marketing hours in Jewel Tea, but allow the fixing of prices in Carroll, is
not clear.
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to constitute a combination in restraint of trade. More specifically, the ques-
tion is whether the unilateral demands which the union enforced by threats,
combined with the willing or reluctant acquiescence of the leaders, can
amount to a combination in restraint of trade. The majority, in a footnote, 42
quoted the court of appeals as concluding that there was no evidence of a
conspiracy and "that all restraints were instituted unilaterally by the unions
and acquiesced in by the orchestra leaders." 43 As Justice White noted in his
dissent, it would be hard to believe that the majority is saying that a union's
unilateral imposition of demands on a nonlabor group can never amount to
a combination in restraint of trade. 44
 The courts48 and the Federal Trade
Commission48 have held that otherwise impermissible arrangements embodied
in collective bargaining agreements would not be validated by union instiga-
tion and initial employer resistance. Surely then, the unilateral imposition of
"otherwise impermissible arrangements" and the forced acquiescence of the
employer would also not validate such arrangements. Here, the union does
not even have the shield of a collective bargaining agreement behind which
to stand. Also, the actual or intended benefits of such arrangements to the
employees should not be the sole test of legality since most such anticompeti-
tive devices ultimately benefit the employee. The finding of a combination in
restraint of trade should not depend upon who originally instigated the plan.
The courts should not condone plans which violate the antitrust laws
simply because they are initiated by a union. The antitrust laws forbid trade
restraints forced on employers by unions as well as restraints initiated by the
employer and acquiesced in by the union."
Conclusion. The main problem posed by Carroll is the extent of its
effect. Does it apply only to the special employment conditions of the music
industry, or does it, as the orchestra leaders' counsel warns, set a broader
precedent giving unions the right under the antitrust laws to fix and enforce,
unilaterally, minimum prices for an entire industry, provided that they do
so to protect wage scales which they impose without collective bargaining? 48
It is submitted that the effect of the case be limited to the special needs of
the music industry because of the very difficult problems raised by general
application of the decision to other industries. But the Court does . not indi-
cate such an intent to limit the effect of the case. As the dissent points out,
42 391 U.S. at 105 n.8.
43 372 F.2d at 164.
44 391 U.S. at 120 n.9 (dissenting opinion).
45 See Hawaiian Tuna Packers, Ltd. v. International Longshoreman's Union, 72 F.
Supp. 562 (D. Hawaii 1947).
46 California Sportswear & Dress Ass'n, 54 F.T.C. 835, 891 (1957).
47 See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 663 (1965):
If the UMW in this case, in order to protect its wage scale by maintaining em-
ployer income, had presented a set of prices at which the mine operators would
be required to sell their coal, the union and the employers who happened to agree
could not successfully defend this contract provision if it were challenged under
the antitrust laws by the United States or by some party injured by the arrange-
ment.
48 Plaintiffs' Petition for Rehearing at 12, American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll,
391 U.S. 99, rch. denied, 89 S. Ct. 64 (1968).
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at any rate, the Court should leave to Congress the determination whether to
make special exceptions to the antitrust laws for the special circumstances of
the music industry.49
 The case raises also the question of the extent to which
unions and employers may justify their anticompetitive schemes on the ground
that they directly benefit the employee union members. Carroll has confused
the once clear distinctions between an employer and his employees with such
concepts as "labor group work" and by division of the employer's functions.
The great expansion of "legitimate union interest" by Carroll seems unjusti-
fied in light of the extensive economic power already possessed by unions
such as the AFM. A single union in an industry such as music possesses a
great deal of bargaining power because of the diversified nature of the man-
agement with which it must deal. The musicians' union "exercises rigid and
monolithic control over much of the music industry," 50
 and does not need
control of the management prerogative of price setting to protect its interests.
Secondly, Carroll seems to defeat the purpose of the NLRA to promote
collective bargaining by denying the full-time leaders their appropriate
status as employers and by allowing the union unilaterally to impose job
conditions without collective bargaining. The whole thrust of both Oliver
and Jewel Tea was that the union has a right to protect its members' interests
by restrictions determined through collective bargaining. But neither case
suggests that unions may restrain competition by refusal to bargain collec-
tively, by coercion of employers into the union and consequent imposition of
anticompetitive conditions through unilaterally adopted bylaws and regula-
tions. As the dissent stated, "The Court treads dangerous ground in seeking
on its own motion to deny to a particular industry the normal competitive
conditions envisioned by the antitrust laws, conditions usually viewed as
essential for maintaining services and prices at satisfactory levels." 5 '
DOUGLAS K. MAGARY
Bankruptcy Law—Bankruptcy Act—Section 77—Jurisdiction of Bank-
ruptcy Court Over State's Right of Eminent Domain.--Commonwealth v.
Bartlett.'—The Boston & Providence Railroad had been undergoing re-
organization 2
 proceedings in the District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts since 1938. The proceedings were being held pursuant to Section 77 of
the Bankruptcy Act,3
 which provides for the reorganization of railroads
42 391 U.S. at 121-22 (dissenting opinion).
5 ° 372 F.2d at 159.
51 391 U.S, at 122 (dissenting opinion).
1
 384 F.2d 819 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968).
2
 A reorganization involves a business plan for winding up the affairs of a bankrupt
corporation, in this case a railroad, by selling its property.
It is usually accomplished by the judicial sale of the corporate property and
franchises, and the formation by the purchasers of a new corporation. The prop-
erty and franchises are thereupon vested in the new corporation and its stock
and bonds are divided among such of the parties interested in the old company
as are parties to the reorganization plan.
Black's Law Dictionary 1462 (4th ed. 1968).
3 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1964).
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